
In this essay, we have traced the political and constitutional evolution of the autonomy of the Autonomous Region of the Azores over its first half-century (1976–2026). We have identified a contemporary process of institutional erosion driven by territorial centralisation and by the fragility of the system of regional government.
Azorean identity did not emerge in 1895. It grew out of a long, unbroken island tradition of self-government stretching back to the settlement of the islands. It took shape in distinctive institutional forms, such as the motto of 1582, “Better to die free than live as subjects,” and in the Constitution of 1822. An analysis of the term adjacent reveals three major philosophical transitions in the Portuguese legal order. The first was “from geography to law,” when physical contiguity gave rise to patrimonial rights for the Crown and to a dominial and absolutist form of Azorean autonomy. The second was “from patrimonial to constitutional autonomy,” with the integration of the “Adjacent Islands” as sovereign territory of the people, formally distinguishing them from colonies and granting them district-level administrative autonomy. The third was “from adjacency to autonomy,” a democratic break in which subordination and geographical dependence gave way to constitutional recognition of a political region endowed with governing bodies of its own.
Although autonomy is among the substantive limits on constitutional revision, that protection offers only a formal guarantee, leaving room for infringements and for the erosion of the system’s substance. The constitutional revisions of 1997 and 2004, in particular, reveal that susceptibility to change. The introduction of the “general laws of the Republic” and the subsequent abolition of the concept of “specific regional interest,” with the matter referred to the Statute, have weakened the quality and legal certainty of regional legislation. Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa offers an ironic reminder to those with short memories when he observes that “constitutional revisions have been gradual processes of constitutional rupture.”
The Political Statute, the democratic charter of Azorean autonomy, enshrined the principle of balanced development and the region’s original polycentric design, founded on solidarity among the islands and on the historic presence of three centres of population and activity. Its political integrity was nonetheless eroded by the statutory revisions of 1998 and 2009, which displaced balanced development as the guiding political principle in favour of an economic criterion centred on equitable development.
SATA’s inter-island services offer concrete evidence of this drift towards centralisation. The regional airline’s operational restructuring concentrated its activity and infrastructure on a single island, producing economic and environmental inefficiencies and driving up costs to an estimated high level. It has also significantly deepened the archipelago’s social and economic isolation and exacted a political and democratic cost whose full extent is still unfolding, though its effects are already plainly visible.
Among the various political models proposed for reforming the system of autonomy, none offers a better solution than the one now in force. We know where the trouble began, and we know the nature of the ailment. The Constitution itself, by conferring powers of the state’s public authority on the Autonomous Region, creates and maintains a distinct system of regional government. Yet that system is deficient in democratic terms, since it bypasses the political checks on government that a properly functioning democracy requires. The implication is plain. The fundamental rights of mainland Portuguese deserve to be guaranteed, above all the principle of equality, while islanders are deemed undeserving of those same guarantees. The Constitution is flawed, and that flaw is for the state to remedy, because successive governments in the Azores, and in Madeira, have sustained themselves through an incomplete form of autonomy that allows them to remain in office without the safeguards of a properly functioning democracy.
The present system of regional government suffers from an excessive concentration of power and lacks an independent office or autonomous regional body with democratic legitimacy of its own, above party politics, that could tip the scales in favour of territorial balance and curb the bureaucratic “banality” of political actors. Reversing the present state of an incomplete and dangerous democracy and recovering the founding principles of political autonomy calls for careful democratic reform capable of restoring inter-island solidarity, substantive equity and full respect for the fundamental rights of Portuguese islanders. Chaotic constitutional revisions and a retreat into municipalism will leave that work undone. The present Azorean model oscillates between parliamentarism and regional semi-presidentialism, while suffering from an extreme concentration of power in the executive and the parties.
The absence of an independent office or of a regional body with democratic legitimacy of its own leaves the territory defenceless against the structural dominance of São Miguel’s political and business elite. It reduces Azorean democracy to a bureaucratic banality, with profound consequences that are already unmistakable.
Final note
At a meeting in Ponta Delgada marking fifty years of autonomy, the economist Álvaro Dâmaso, a former regional secretary for finance under Mota Amaral, said, “We need a centre. We cannot have a seat of power on every island, because that is why it does not work. It is wrong.” (Diário dos Açores, 1 November 2026, p. 8.) A report carried the headline “Business leaders of the Central Group advocate economic and territorial unity.” (Diário Insular, 7 November 2026, p. 8.)
Arnaldo Ourique is a specialist on the Azorean Autonomy and writes regurlaly for the Azorean Press.
